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Abstract
Spoofing refers to the intentional (and considered malicious) interference to a GNSS user’s inputs so as to distort
the derived position information. A variety of approaches
to detect spoofing have been proposed in the literature.
Much of this prior work has focused on the conceptual
level with limited analysis of the resulting detection performance, and/or has proposed fundamental redesign of
the receiver itself. Little effort has been directed towards
using existing, commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) standalone receiver technology to perform spoof detection.

GNSS systems are well known to be accurate providers
of position and timing information across the globe. As
such, they are commonly used to locate and navigate craft
in various transportation modes (e.g. land vehicles, boats
and ships, and aircraft). Because of high signal availabilities, capable/robust receivers, and well-populated satellite constellations, operators typically believe that the location information provided by their GNSS receiver is
correct. Researchers (who are arguably a more skeptical
group) often think more about the integrity of location
information, and are interested in how a receiver might
calculate its measure of integrity, or even how one or more
receivers might be used to determine if position information is illegitimate, or spoofed. Here, spoofing refers
to intentional (and considered malicious) interference to
a GNSS user’s inputs so as to distort the derived position information. Depending upon the cargo and/or
mission of the transport, calculation of the user’s position in the presence of one or more spoofers can provide hazardously misleading information, possibly resulting in disastrous consequences in safety critical applications. One way to detect a spoofing event is to use some
sort of ground-based augmentation system; however, such
detection methods inherently require additional groundbased infrastructure. A much more attractive approach
is to have the user self check against spoofing; essentially
a RAIM-like integrity test, but monitoring for spoofing
and not satellite faults. A variety of approaches of this
second type have been proposed in the literature. Some
are based upon including additional signal processing capability in the receiver. While these techniques are valid,
they are less appropriate for use in a cockpit where receiver certification is a concern or, perhaps, where the
cost of new equipment is a significant issue.

At ION ITM 2013 these authors proposed a simple spoof
detection concept based on the use of multiple COTS receivers and analyzed the performance of several ad hoc
detection algorithms from a Neyman-Pearson perspective
assuming Gaussian statistics. At ION GNSS+ 2013, by
restricting attention to a horizontal platform and assuming an independent measurement error model, we were
able to develop the optimum Neyman-Pearson hypothesis test. That paper also included an analysis of performance, yielding closed form expressions for the false
alarm and detection probabilities and an optimization of Technical discussions on spoof detection can vary widely
the performance over the locations of the receivers’ an- depending upon the assumed capabilities and a priori
knowledge of the spoofer. In 2003 Warner and Johnston
tennae.
suggested several possible methods to detect a spoofing
This current works extends the earlier results by consid- event at a single GNSS receiver [1]: monitoring the power
ering more realistic statistical models, considers the pro- levels of the GNSS signals (absolute, relative, and across
cessing of several sequential outputs from the receivers, satellites), checking that the observed constellation is corand addresses 3-D receiver antennae patterns.
rect for the given time (e.g. number of and IDs of the
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satellites), testing the accuracy of the clock component,
and checking the computed position against that derived
from some non-GNSS source (e.g. an IMU). Since then
various authors have experimented with spoofing and suggested detectors including correlating the P(Y) code at
the RF level [2], looking for vestigial peaks in the correlator outputs [3], comparing to trusted reference signals [4],
and using an antennae array to spatially locate and identify signals [5]. Much of this prior work has focused on
the conceptual level with limited analysis of the resulting
detection performance, and/or has proposed fundamental redesign of the receiver itself. Unfortunately, little
work has been directed towards using existing commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) stand-alone receiver technology
to perform spoof detection.

(actually a generalized likelihood ratio test to account for
unknown platform rotation and position) was shown to
examine the separation of and relative locations of the
estimated positions. This work included an analysis of
performance, yielding closed form expressions for the false
alarm and detection probabilities. We were then able to
optimize the performance over the locations of the receiver antennae. Of note, if the antennae are restricted
to fall within a disk of radius r, we were able to show that
the optimum configuration has all of the antenna on the
edge of the disk in a symmetric arrangement. Further,
we showed that using 3 or 4 antennae/receivers spaced
4σ or more apart (σ being the standard deviation of the
measurement error in any direction, typically 1-2 meters
for current receivers) yields excellent performance.

Recently, at ION ITM 2013, we examined a simple spoof The current paper extends this prior work [7] in the foldetection concept based upon the use of multiple COTS lowing ways:
receivers and attempted to assess its performance un• Better statistical models – While the choice of indeder nominal assumptions on the signal environment [6].
pendent East and North errors simplified the analySpecifically, the detector monitors GNSS signals using
sis, it does not match reality; the exact GNSS connot one, but two or more receivers with their antennae
stellation being viewed results in correlation between
at known relative positions. With no spoofer present,
the resulting East and North errors (this leads to the
each antenna would receive a unique RF signal consistent
use of GDOP as a figure of merit in GNSS perforwith its position in space. Under the assumption that
mance). This work extends the detection analysis,
the spoofer is present, and has only one broadcast anemploying unequal variances and a non-zero correlatenna, these multiple receivers would receive nearly idention for the East and North errors for the case of a
tical spoofer RF signals; the presence of spoofing is thus
symmetric antennae configuration.
discernible from the near equivalence of the receivers’ re• Time sequential processing – Our original approach
ceptions. While one could compare these multiple recepmight be called a “snapshot” method in that it protions at the RF level, we proposed comparing the position
cesses just one set of positions to decide spoof versolutions across receivers, declaring a spoofing event if the
sus no spoof. Allowing multiple measurements, we
resulting position solutions are too close to each other as
develop a test that looks for similar/equivalent geocompared to the known relative locations of the antenmetric relationships across time. In this paper we renae. The primary advantage of such an approach is that
port on two ways to combine such data: a “coherent”
an implementation of the hypothesis test does not require
approach which assumes that the platform does not
receiver hardware modification (hence, no recertification
rotate between measurements and a “non-coherent”
is necessary) or even access to software GNSS methods;
approach which allows for rotation.
a separate processor could easily monitor the positions
generated by each of the antennae/receivers and decide
• Extension to 3D – We extend the problem and soluspoof or no spoof. Our January 2013 work proposed sevtion formulations to allow for antennae at different
eral ad hoc detection algorithms (resulting from different
altitudes (which may be especially appropriate for
assumptions on the receivers’ antennae locations; specifisome platforms).
cally, known positions, known relative positions with orientation information, and known relative positions without orientation information) and analyzed each detector The Problem
from a Neyman-Pearson perspective assuming Gaussian
Imagine a configuration of m GPS antennae/receivers,
statistics.
each of which provides a two dimensional position soluSince that time we have improved our approach to spoof tion based upon its observed RF signals (while latitude
detection, presenting the results at ION GNSS+ 2013 [7]. and longitude are the nominal coordinates, we will assume
Specifically, by restricting the antennae location model that they are converted to East and North in a local refto a horizontal platform and assuming that the measure- erence frame). For simplicity of the resulting analysis,
ment errors were independent Gaussian variables, we were we will parameterize the position of each antenna as a
able to develop the form of the optimum hypothesis test point on the complex plane relative to some fixed origin.
under the Neyman-Pearson criterion; this optimum test Specifically, the k th antenna, k = 1, . . . m, is at position
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dk = dk,r + jdk,i (in this decomposition into real and
imaginary components, we will think of the real part as
the East component and the imaginary part as the North
component of the position). Further, and without loss
of generality, we will assume that the origin of our reference frame is such that the centroid of these antennae
positions is zero, so that

In [7] we assumed white noise for nk ; here we will keep the
Gaussian model and zero mean, but allow the individual
real and imaginary parts to have different variances and
to be correlated. As a complex random variable
nk ∼ CN (0, Γk , Ck )

Note that the parameters of this model are dependent
upon the satellites in view to antenna k. Since we assume
dk = 0
that the antennae are nearly co-located, then we assume
k=1
that the sky view is the same for each antennae, so Γk = Γ
Our interest is in mounting this array of antennae onto and Ck = C; in other words, the noise at each antenna
a moving platform; hence, relative to the location of the has the same statistics. We also assume independence of
centroid, the array could have a random orientation with the noise for different k.
respect to true East/North. Keeping the array horizontal, we model this as an angular rotation by angle θ (in For those not familiar with complex Gaussian variates,
radians) on the complex plane. As such, the position of consider a pair of jointly Gaussian variables xr and xi .
the k th antenna is now dk ejθ . For our spoof detector each Standard notation (listing the two means, two variances,
antenna processes the RF signals it receives, yielding an and the correlation coefficient) that is used to describe
estimate of its position; this position is a complex num- their statistics is

ber in that same reference frame which we will denote by
(xr , xi ) ∼ N µr , µi , σr2 , σi2 , ρ
xk = xk,r + jxk,i . We will assume that the error in this
estimate is dominated by additive Gaussian noise, so will If we construct the complex random variable x from these
employ complex Gaussian distributions when describing two random variables as
the statistics of these positions. In [7] we assumed a white
noise component; here we want to take into account the
x = xr + jxi
satellite geometry as described by HDOP (i.e. unequal
variances on the components along with correlation) and then
will use a more general model.
x ∼ CN (µ, Γ, C)
m
X

We consider two situations, the null hypothesis, H0 , in with
which no spoofer is present and the alternative hypothesis, H1 , in which a spoofer is present:

µ = µr + jµi

Γ = σr2 + σi2
H0 : With no spoofer present we assume that each individual antenna is giving an accurate estimate of its and
C = σr2 − σi2 + j2ρσr σi
actual position. For notation, let b represent the true
position of the centroid of the antennae array; includ- Obviously, one can also write expression for the parameing this position offset, the rotation for each antenna, ters in the reverse direction.
and additive Gaussian noise terms (nk ), we have a
model for the position observations of

The Test

xk = b + dk ejθ + nk

Our hypothesis test from [7], which assumed white statistics on the measurement noise, is

for k = 1, 2, . . . m.
H1 : With a spoofer present we assume that the antennae all receive identical RF signals; hence, all would
provide noisy estimates of the same constant position. (We assume that the spoofer takes over all
satellite signals; we would have to modify this characterization if only some satellites were spoofed. And
with only one radiator, a spoofer can create only one
possible position solution). Letting c represent this
spoofed position, we have the observation model
xk = c + n k
for k = 1, 2, . . . m.

T (x1 , . . . , xk ) = −

m
X
k=1

d∗k xk

H1
>
<
H0

λ

While this form is quite simple, its performance does vary
as a function of antenna configuration, satellite constellation, and platform orientation. Our goal is to analyze
these effects. Before presenting the analysis, we note that
the test statistic is independent of translation of the data.
This is particularly important is that it means that any
common-mode bias in the GNSS positions is ignored by
the test.
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Let’s begin an analysis. For convenience, we write the To develop the performance expressions, it is convenient
test as
to convert the complex variable y back into two separate
H1
components, the real part yr and the imaginary part yi .
>
T (x1 , . . . , xk ) = − |y| < λ
The
means for each part are just the real and imaginary
H0
parts of the complex mean, respectively. Under H0
with
m
m
X
X
µy,r = mr2 cos θ and µy,i = mr2 sin θ
y=
d∗k xk =
yk
k=1
k=1
Since θ is an unknown angle, the center of the distribution
on the (yr , yi ) plane is somewhere on a circle of radius mr2
Consider the individual terms in the summation for y
about the origin. Under H1 both means are zero. Since Γ
yk = d∗k xk
is real and C is zero for both hypotheses, we have equal
variances for the two components
As separate linear functions of independent complex
mr2 Γ
2
2
Gaussian random variables (the xk ), the yk are jointly
σy,r
= σy,i
=
2
complex Gaussian and maintain their independence; the
sum of these terms, y, is also complex Gaussian. Simpli- Finally, since Γ is real and C is zero, we have zero correfying the algebra, the distributions are
lation
!
ρy = 0
m
m
m
X
X
X
jθ
2
2
∗ 2
In other words, the bivariate distributions are
y ∼ CN e
|dk | , Γ
|dk | , C
(dk )


k=1
k=1
k=1
mr2 Γ mr2 Γ
,
,0
(yr , yi ) ∼ N mr2 cos θ, mr2 sin θ,
under H0 and
2
2
!
m
m
and
X
X


mr2 Γ mr2 Γ
y ∼ CN 0, Γ
|dk |2 , C
(d∗k )2
(yr , yi ) ∼ N 0, 0,
,
,0
2
2
k=1
k=1
under H1 . We note that these expressions depend upon under H0 and H1 , respectively.
two functions of the antennae locations
The test itself can also be written in terms of these components
m
m
X
X
(d∗k )2
|dk |2 and
H1
k=1
k=1
T (x1 , . . . , xk ) = − |y| >
< λ
H0

q
= − yr2 + yi2

H1

In [7] the optimality of a circular symmetric antenna con>
< λ
figuration was noted. Focusing our attention on such a
H0
pattern, let
2πk
Multiplying by −1 reverses the direction of the test
dk = rej ( m +φ)
q
H0
for k = 1, 2, . . . m with φ an arbitrary phase shift and r a
T (x1 , . . . , xk ) = yr2 + yi2 >
< λ
known radius. After some algebra, the first constant can
H1
be seen to reduce to
In other words, if the observation when viewed on the
m
X
(yr , yi ) plane is outside a circle of radius λ, then we decide
|dk |2 = mr2
H0 , no spoofer; if inside the circle, we decide H1 .
k=1

The second summation can be shown to equal zero if m > Test Performance for m > 2
2. The combined result is that for symmetric arrays of
m = 3 or more antennae, the complex random variable y The probability of detection is the probability under H1
has distributions
that the test statistic is smaller than the threshold
q


y ∼ CN ejθ md2 , mr2 Γ, 0
y2 + y2 < λ
Pd = ProbH
1

and

r

i

Since (yr , yi ) is bivariate Gaussian under H1 then
ZZ
1 − 12 (yr2 +yi2 )
under H0 and H1 , respectively. We defer the m = 2 case
e 2σ
dyr dyi
Pd =
2πσ 2
to a separate section below.
Ω

y ∼ CN 0, mr2 Γ, 0
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in which, for simplicity, we have introduced the notation
σ2 =

mr2 Γ
2

This final form can be written in terms of Marcum’s Q
function [8, pp.344-346]


λ
Pfa = 1 − Q γ,
σ

and Ω is the disk about the origin of radius λ. Changing
variables to polar coordinates of magnitude s (chosen to Substituting for γ and σ
avoid using r with two definitions) and phase angle φ
!
r
r
yields
2mr2
2
Z 2π Z λ
Pfa = 1 − Q
,λ
s − s22
Γ
mr2 Γ
2σ dsdφ
e
Pd =
2
2πσ
0
0

in which we have explicitly described the limits of integration of Ω. Integrating first over φ, then over s yields At this point we have expressions for Pfa and Pd in terms
of the system parameters of number of antennae, m, spacλ2
λ2
− 2σ
− mr
ing of the antennae, r, and the variance of the position
2
2Γ
Pd = 1 − e
=1−e
error, Γ. We can invert the Pd expression for the threshold λ
p
λ = −mr2 Γ ln (1 − Pd )
The false alarm of the test is the probability under H0
Inserting this result into the expression for Pfa , we have
that the test statistic is smaller than the threshold
q

!
r
2mr2 p
Pfa = ProbH0
yr2 + yi2 < λ
Pfa = 1 − Q
, −2 ln (1 − Pd )
Γ
Again, (yr , yi ) is bivariate Gaussian, but with non-zero
We acknowledge that some might think that this expresmeans, so
sion is backwards, that it is more usual in hypothesis
ZZ
2 cos θ 2 + y −mr 2 sin θ 2
testing to write the detection probability as a function of
y
−mr
) (i
)
1 −( r
2σ 2
the false alarm probability. However, the utility of this
dy
dy
Pfa =
e
r
i
2πσ 2
closed-form expression is that for a fixed Pd and noise
Ω
variance parameter Γ, the known monotonically of Mar(again using the notation σ 2 ). Changing to polar coordi- cum’s Q function in its arguments implies that our test’s
nates yields
performance improves with increasing r and m.
Z 2π

Z λ
As examples, Figure 1 shows a typical ROC for m = 4 and
s − s2 +m22 r4
1 smr2 2 cos(φ−θ)
2σ
σ
Pfa =
e
e
dφ
ds various spacings of the antennae (r) while Figure 2 shows
2
2π
0 σ
0
a ROC for r = 1.5 and various numbers of antennae (m).
Now, the inner integral in brackets can be manipulated In both of these examples we have, for convenience, set Γ
by changing variables to ζ = φ − θ, using the periodicity to unity. These figures demonstrate the monotonicity of
of the cosine function to shift the integration limits, and the performance with increasing m and/or r.
recognizing the definition of the modified Bessel function
of the first kind. The result for the false alarm probability
Including HDOP
is then


Z λ
The expressions for the false alarm and detection probas − s2 +m22 r4
smr2
2σ
Pfa =
e
I0
ds
2
2
bilities developed above depend upon the parameters of
σ
σ
0
the antennae array (through m and r) and the underlyTo simplify this expression, we first change variables to
ing position inaccuracies through Γ. The parameter Γ
can also be written as
s
z=
2
σ
Γ = σUERE
HDOP2
so
in which σUERE is the user equivalent range error and
Z σλ
HDOP is the horizontal dilution of precision. With this
− 12 [z 2 +γ 2 ]
Pfa =
ze
I0 (zγ) dz
relationship, the performance of our spoof detector is
0
s
!
with
2
p
2mr
mr2
Pfa = 1 − Q
, −2 ln (1 − Pd )
2
γ=
σUERE
HDOP2
σ
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P

P

Figure 1: ROC for m = 4 and Γ = 1 with different
values for r (in meters).

Figure 2: ROC for d = 1.5 meters and Γ = 1 with
various m.

fa

fa

0

10

metric(m, r) =

2mr2
2
σUERE
HDOP2

0.9
0.99
0.999
−2

10

Pfa

For example, HDOP = 1 and σUERE = 1 would yield
the Γ = 1 employed for Figures 1 and 2. Realistic values
for these parameters are HDOP of unity and σUERE of
approximately 4 [9]. An obvious metric for performance
(essentially a signal to noise ratio as a function of the
parameters that we control, m and r) is the square of the
first argument of the Marcum Q-function

−4

10

−6

10

0

5

10

15

r

Clearly we are interested in very small Pfa and large Pd , so
need to look more clearly at the performance expression
to understand the roles of m and r. Toward this end,
imagine that m = 4 and Γ = 16 (using the realistic HDOP
and σUERE values), and that the threshold, λ, is set so
that Pd is either 0.9, 0.99, or 0.999. Figure 3 shows the
corresponding Pfa for a range of r values. For example,
we observe that for r =√10 meters (4 antenna on a square
with side lengths of 10 2 meters) we achieve Pfa ≈ 10−5
and Pd ≈ 0.99! The Pfa and Pd expressions depend upon
the antenna array through the product mr2 only; in other
words, an array of 4 antenna on a circle of radius 10
meters has a score of mr2 = 4 · 102 = 400, the same as a
5 antenna array array with r just below 9 or 3 antennae
with d ≈ 11.5. To understand the scale of these values for
platforms of interest, Figure 4 shows the 3 and 4 antennae
locations on a Boeing 757 airplane.

Figure 3: Pfa versus r for m = 4, Γ = 16, and selected
values of Pd .

The Case of 2 Antennae
Some long and narrow platforms, track trailers or ships,
might be better suited to a two antenna solution; for
example, r = 7 as shown in Figure 5. Assuming that
d1 = rejφ and d2 = −rejφ , we can drop the common
multiplication by rejφ and simplify the test to
T (x1 , x2 ) = − |x1 − x2 |

H1
>
<
H0

λ

Concentrating on the term within the absolute value symbols
y = x1 − x2
we have the following characterizations:
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under both hypotheses. As n1 and −n2 are independent
and identically distributed, their sum has the same correlation coefficient of ρ under both hypotheses. Summarizing, under H0

(yr , yi ) ∼ N 2d cos θ, 2d sin θ, 2σr2 , 2σi2 , ρ
and under H1

(yr , yi ) ∼ N 0, 0, 2σr2 , 2σi2 , ρ

r=10 meters
r=11.5 meters

Figure 4: Antennae layout on a 757 aircraft.

14 meters

Figure 5: Antennae layout on tracker trailer.

• Under H0 , this variable is
y

At this point we want to calculate the probabilities of false
alarm and detection which correspond to integrals within
a disk of radius λ on the complex plane corresponding to
y. Figure 6 shows such a situation with λ = 1 (the red,
dashed circle is the decision boundary), the elliptical contours of the pdf under H1 are shown in green, the possible
location of the mean√under H0 is shown as a blue, dashed
circle with radius of 5, and three typical contours of the
pdf under H0 are shown in blue. Under both hypotheses,
this figure assumes that σr = 2σi and that the correlation
coefficient is ρ = 0.5. It is very clear from this figure that
while the probability of detection is fixed (integrating the
green pdf inside the red circle is merely mathematically
ugly), the probability of false alarm (integrating a blue
pdf inside the red circle) depends upon the relative location of the center of the ellipse (equivalently, the rotation
angle θ).

3

= x1 − x2
= 2rejθ + n1 − n2

2

1

• Under H1 , it is
0

y

= x1 − x2
= n1 − n2

−1
decision boundary
mean of y under H0

Since both n1 and −n2 (the negative of n2 ) are complex
Gaussian then so is their sum

pdf under H1

−2

pdf under H0 for different values for θ
−3

−2

−1

0

1

2

3

n1 − n2 ∼ CN (0, 2Γ, 2C)
To facilitate a performance analysis in this case, it is convenient to again return to a bivariate description of y
under the two hypotheses. Under H0 we have means
µy,r = 2r cos θ

and

µy,i = 2d sin θ

Figure 6: Distributions of y under H0 and H1 and the
integration boundary.
To facilitate doing these computations, it is convenient to
rotate the data by angle
1
2ρσr σi
ζ = − tan−1 2
2
σr − σi2

while under H1 both means are zero. As Γ is real and C
is complex, we have variances
2
σy,r
= 2σr2

and

2
σy,i
= 2σi2

so that the major axis of the ellipse is parallel to the
horizontal axis. Let z represent this new pair of variables.
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With this rotation, the probability density function of
z under the two hypotheses is still bivariate Gaussian.
Specifically, under H0

(zr , zi ) ∼ N 2r cos ψ, 2r sin ψ, σ12 , σ12 , 0
with ψ an arbitrary angle and
q
σ12 = σr2 + σi2 + (σr2 − σi2 )2 + 4ρ2 σr2 σi2
q
2
2
2
σ1 = σr + σi − (σr2 − σi2 )2 + 4ρ2 σr2 σi2
(Note that the signs in front of the square roots assume
that σr > σi ; if not, they should be reversed.) Under H1

(zr , zi ) ∼ N 0, 0, σ12 , σ12 , 0
With this change of variables, the equivalent view in z
is shown in Figure 7. In this figure we also show the
Figure 8: Bounding region for Pfa (top) and Pd
best case and worst case locations for the distributions (bottom). (Please ignore the vertical line on the left of
under H0 (best at the top which would yield the smallest the top figure; it’s a MatLab artifact that I cannot get
Pfa , worst at the right). At this point we could attempt
rid of!)
the integrals inside the red circle to yield the false alarm
and detection probabilities. Unfortunately, if σ12 6= σ22 no
closed form solution exists. One could, of course, perform One simple upper bound for Pfa is to use a half-plane to
the integration numerically (probably easiest in polar co- encapsulate the spoofing decision region, Ω, as shown in
the top subfigure of Figure 8. The result is
ordinates).


2r − λ
Pfa ≤ Q
σ1
3

Other bounds are obviously possible.

2.5

The detection probability can lower bounded with an inscribed box as shown in the lower subfigure of Figure 8. In
general, we could use a box with corners (±a, ±b) where
a and b satisfy a2 + b2 = λ2 and maximize the result over
a and b. Mathematically

  
 
a
b
Pd ≥ 1 − 2Q
1 − 2Q
σ1
σ2

2
1.5
1
0.5
0
−0.5
−1
decision boundary
mean of y under H0

−1.5

pdf under H1
pdf under H0 for different values for θ

−2
−2

−1

0

1

2

3

4

At this point we can try several approaches. One would
be to use the half-plane bound for Pfa to evaluate λ
λ = 2r − σ1 Q−1 (Pfa )

Figure 7: Distributions of z under H0 and H1 and the
integration boundary.

use a2 + b2 = λ2 to solve for b in terms of λ
p
b = λ2 − a2

An alternative, pursued here, is to bound the expressions.
and then optimize Pd (numerically?) over a and b. A
Examining the figures, we have
second approach is to choose a and b to satisfy


2
ZZ
zi2
zr
1
−2
1
2 + σ2
a
b
σ1
2 dz dz
Pd =
e
r
i
=
2πσ1 σ2
σ1
σ2
Ω

and in the worst case

ZZ
− 12
1
Pfa =
e
2πσ1 σ2
Ω

(zr −2r)2
2
σ1


2

+

zi
2
σ2

dzr dzi

so that the bound simplifies. The result is
"
!#2
λ
Pd ≥ 1 − 2Q p 2
σ1 + σ22
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Multi-Sample Tests

distributions is to increase the means and variances by a
factor of N :

Imagine collecting position samples as the platform is
(n)
moving. Indexing time samples by the variable n, let xk
th
represent the n time sample at antenna k, k = 1, 2, . . . m
and n = 1, 2, . . . N . For the discussion below we assume
that the samples are sufficiently far apart in time so that and
the measurement errors on each antenna are independent
complex Gaussian variates.

N
X


y (n) ∼ CN ejθ N mr2 , N mr2 Γ, 0

n=1

N
X


y (n) ∼ CN 0, N mr2 Γ, 0

n=1

We envision two different situation depending upon In this case, the performance results of the single snapshot
whether or not the platform rotates during the measure- analysis directly extend with the addition of the factor of
ment period:
N
λ2
Pd,coherent = 1 − e− 2N mr2 Γ
• No rotation — modifying the development of the test
for independent spatial errors in [7] (the generalized and
likelihood ratio test for a single unknown angle of
!
r
r
rotation) results in the test
2N mr2
2
Pfa,coherent = 1 − Q
,λ
Γ
N mr2 Γ
N
m
X
X
(1)
)
T (x1 , . . . , x(N
d∗k xk
m )=−
or
!
r
n=1 k=1
2N mr2 p
Pfa = 1 − Q
, −2 ln (1 − Pd )
Γ
Combining the spatial matched filter outputs before
the absolute value is a kind of coherent processing in
which we exploit the fact that the random orientation From this last expression, it is clear that the metric has
increased by a factor of N
is constant over the entire time.
• Unknown rotations — if we allow the rotation to be
different for each data snapshot, then the generalized
likelihood ratio test should optimize over each angle
separately. Doing so yields the test
(1)

)
T (x1 , . . . , x(N
m )=−

N X
m
X
n=1 k=1

d∗k xk

metriccoherent (m, r, N )

=

2N mr2
2
σUERE
HDOP2

= N metric(m, r)
and we observe that we can trade time (repeated sampling) for either number of receivers (m) or spacing (r).
For example, employing 4 sets of time samples allows us
to half the radius of the antennae array.

Combining the spatial matched filter outputs after
the absolute value is a noncoherent operation.
The analysis for the non-coherent case is slightly harder.
Since we take the absolute value first, before summing
Recall that the summation over k is invariant to the acover n, we have a set of N independent Rician random
tual location of the vessel; hence, the statistical distribuvariable (Rayleigh under H0 ). Unfortunately, there aptions of each summation over k for different values of n
pear to be no closed form results for computing Pfa and
are identical in the coherent case and identical except for
Pd . However, we conjecture that the metric increases by
a rotation in the non coherent case. Assuming that the
a square root of N
m > 2 antennae are uniformly spread on a circle of ra√
dius d, then each sum over m is an independent complex
2 N mr2
metric
(m,
r,
N
)
≈
non−coherent
Gaussian variate under both hypotheses. Specifically, for
2
σUERE
HDOP2
m
√
X
(n)
≈
N metric(m, r)
y (n) =
d∗k xk
k=1

then
y (n) ∼ CN ejθ mr2 , md2 Γ, 0



Extending to 3 Dimensions

For some platforms of interest (e.g. aircraft), limiting
the problem statement to a horizontal placement of the
y
antennae seems appropriate. For others, however, such
under H0 and H1 , respectively. For the coherent test, we as ships, the option to place an antenna on the top of a
sum N such independent variable, so the change in the superstructure might be available and might provide some
and

(n)

2


∼ CN 0, mr Γ, 0
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improvement to performance. To consider this, we add
an altitude measurement to our situation, maintaining
the option to rotate the array in the horizontal plane by
angle θ. Letting gk and zk be the actual and measured
altitude for antenna k, respectively, the first question is
how to extend the test statistic. Assuming that we define
our origin so that we have a vertical centroid condition
m
X


x1 ∼ CN −rejθ , 2σ 2 , 0

x2 ∼ CN rejθ , 2σ 2 , 0



h
− , σz2
2


h 2
z2 ∼ N
, σz
2

z1 ∼ N

• Under H1 we have
gk = 0

k=1

then extending the white measurement error analysis
from [7] yields the test
T (x1 , z1 , . . . , xk , zk ) =

• Under H0 we have

m
X

d∗k xk +

k=1

m
X

H0
δ
gk zk >
<
H1
k=1

λ


x1 ∼ CN 0, 2σ 2 , 0

z1 ∼ N 0, σz2




x2 ∼ CN 0, 2σ 2 , 0

z2 ∼ N 0, σz2



all mutually independent. The distributions of the terms
in the test statistic are
• Under H0

where we have added the scalar δ
jθ

σ2
δ= 2
σz

2


yh ∼ CN 2re , 4σ , 0


yv ∼ N

h, 2

δh
2r

2

!
σz2

With the non-zero mean of yh , the distribution of
|yh | is non-central chi.
(the ratio of the horizontal position error variance, σ 2 ,
to the vertical error variance, σz2 ) to take into account
• Under H1
that vertical accuracy is usually worse than horizontal
 2 !
accuracy. Clearly an analysis of performance involves the

δh
2
combination of a non-central chi distribution (from the
yh ∼ CN 0, 4σ , 0
yv ∼ N 0, 2
σz2
2r
horizontal term) and a Gaussian distribution (from the
vertical term). Because of this, we do not expect to be
In this case, the distribution of |yh | is central chi.
able to find closed form results, but expect that bounds
might be possible.
The next question is to find the distribution of T unTo continue the discussion, consider an example of a plat- der the two hypotheses. Unfortunately, even in the independent case, the convolution of the Gaussian and nonform with 2 antennae mounted at different heights
central chi densities does not appear to lead to a closed
h
form expression. Instead, we resorted to simulation.
d1 = −r, g1 = −
2
1. We selected system parameters of r = 10, h = 4,
σ = 4, and σz = 8 (δ = 0.25)
and
h
d2 = +r, g2 = +
2. We generated 200, 000 sets of the 6 Gaussian random
2
variables needed under H0
where 2r and h are the length and height of the platform,
respectively. With this choice, the test statistic is
3. We computed T for each trial; note that without loss


of generality we can set θ = 0
h
h
T = |−rx1 + rx2 | + δ − z1 + z2
4. We repeated steps 2 and 3 for H1 (the independence
2
2
of the trials allows us to better describe the results)
Without loss of generality, we can modify the coefficients
5. We sorted the values of T, counted them to estimate
and use the test
Pfa and Pd , and plotted the resulting ROC
δh
T = |x2 − x1 | +
(z2 − z1 )
For comparison, we also simulated a second platform with
2r
h = 0 (and ignored the vertical component, i.e. T = |yh |).
= |yh | + yv
Figure 9 shows portions of the two ROCs for comparison.
To analyze this test we need statistical models for the Clearly the vertical separation helps. At this time we are
measurements. For simplicity, we characterize yh and yv unable to characterize how much gain a specific separaseparately. Invoking the white assumption:
tion yields.
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Figure 9: Sample ROCs with and without vertical
separation.
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